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Does Risk Aversion Affect Bank Output Loss? 
The Case of the Eurozone 
 
 






We propose a new model to infer the evolution of bank-specific output losses due to 
the uncertainty in bank output prices. Losses are based on bank risk aversion with micro 
foundations tethered to the uncertainty regarding prices. Our model allows us to 
measure time-varying bank-specific output losses and risk aversion while taking into 
account all bank cross-sectional heterogeneity. We employ a panel data set to estimate 
the input and output elasticities with both parametric and non-parametric techniques. 
We are the first to document that increasing risk aversion among Eurozone banks during 
the financial crisis resulted in sizable output losses. Although subdued thereafter, losses 
have been resurging in recent years. Both conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy responses by the European Central Bank (ECB) mitigated uncertainty in bank 
output prices, though unequally so across countries. Certain measures of 
unconventional monetary policy may have even enhanced bank risk aversion and 
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Defining and measuring bank risk has been subject to much controversy, also because 
of the intrinsic difficulties in disentangling its underlying determinants. As is evident from a 
review of this literature (see below), and despite the plethora of studies that exist, there is a gap 
when it comes to the underlying bank risk based on micro foundations. Our paper aims to fill 
this gap. 
We provide a structural model of bank output losses based on bank risk aversion with 
micro foundations tethered to the uncertainty regarding prices in the three broad categories of 
bank outputs, i.e., loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees.1 Bank risk 
aversion is endogenous for bank managers, and their aim is to maximize expected profit without 
regarding its variability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a bank risk 
aversion model based on individual bank optimization. 
The model follows Froot & Stein (1998) who analyze the capital allocation and capital 
structure decisions facing financial institutions. Their model incorporates two key features: 
Value maximizing banks want to manage risks and not all the risks they face can be hedged 
frictionless in financial markets. Departing from their approach we develop a new model of 
bank level risk that factors in the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. 
In our model risk is bank-specific and as such we are able to explicitly measure bank 
risk exposure as derived from a profit maximization process where uncertainty regarding input 
and output price elasticities determines the bank`s risk aversion which in turn is directly related 
to risk. In fact, standard micro foundations suggest that the expected utility under profit 
maximization relies on the entire distribution of risky activities. As in Freixas & Parigi (1998) 
we build on the notion that the expected price of outputs is uncertain. And, as in Appelbaum & 
Ullah (1997) bank risk aversion will be measured based on the first order conditions of a 
flexible indirect von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with respect to outputs.2 
 
1 The notion that banks might be risk averse is not new. Stiglitz & Greenwald (2003) for example argue 
that banks due to information asymmetry and competition imperfections may follow risk adverse 
practices. The degree of bank risk aversion may crucially depend upon a bank`s net worth (see also Rajan 
(2006); Borio & Zhu (2012); Delis, Iosifidi, & Tsionas (2017) and Quaranta, Raffoni, & Visani (2018); 
Glass and Kenjegalieva, (2019)). Following from this idea, we explore whether uncertainty around these 
three bank output prices, that in turn would impact upon bank net worth, would also affect bank risk 
aversion. We follow Santomero (1997) in our categorization of risky financial assets. Of course, banks 
could also lend more or less depending on the uncertainty of the outcomes of doing so (Akerlof (1970) 
and Stiglitz & Weiss (1981)), a direction of estimation we leave open for future research. 
2 See also Henderson & Hobson (2013) who model the behavior of a risk-averse agent who seeks to 
maximize expected utility. In general, there is some gap in the banking literature because the 
microeconomic foundations of banking may have been somewhat neglected when it comes to measuring 
bank risk. From a theoretical point of view a handful of general equilibrium models have been proposed 
(for example Segoviano Basurto & Goodhart (2009); Tarashev, Borio, & Tsatsaronis (2010); Benchimol 
(2014); Cai and Singham, (2018)). Yet such models are hard to estimate. On the other hand, some applied 






Our model further builds on the concept that with more risk aversion each of the three 
outputs, i.e., loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees, will be lower, and 
that the converse would also be true. This is an effective way of measuring bank risk aversion 
due to uncertainty in expected output prices, as we clearly identify it for the case of loans, for 
other earning assets and for off balance sheet items and fees. 3  The simplicity of such 
identification lies in measuring bank output losses due to bank risk aversion, in terms of lower 
outputs. 
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the estimation of our new measure of bank risk 
aversion is rather cumbersome. As such we contribute to the literature by providing both 
parametric and non-parametric estimations of bank risk aversion and thus bank output losses 
that are bank/country-specific but also time-varying. To this end, we employ a panel data set 
that contains banks operating in the Eurozone between 2001 and 2015 that gives an unbalanced 
panel of 39,681 observations, which comprises 5,017 different banks. In addition, we provide 
the framework for a second stage analysis based on GMM estimation of a panel Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) where endogeneity is appropriately tackled, whilst we are able to 
estimate responses of bank risk aversion to covariates, notably ECB monetary policy, whether 
conventional or unconventional. 
Moreover, in the empirical application we provide evidence on bank risk aversion in 
the Eurozone, a region that has been dealing with bank solvency issues for some years now. 
Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) and De Haas & Van Horen (2013) for example study the 
consequences on bank lending due to financial crisis. Findings from these studies show that 
there is variability in bank lending across banks and countries during the financial crisis, though 
overall there is a detrimental effect on bank lending (Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010)). The case 
of Eurozone is of interest as it constitutes a currency zone where monetary policy has been very 
active with a remarkable focus on financial stability. Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina 
(2014) for example provide loan level evidence of the presence of a risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy in Spain. Our proposed framework allows us to disentangle the short from the 
long run impact of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies on bank risk 
aversion and thereby output losses. 
Our estimates suggest that during the financial crisis sizeable bank output losses 
materialized due to increases in bank risk aversion, and that for some Member States of the 
 
models, have been proposed to assess bank risk. In fact, there are a plethora of approaches, from financial 
contagion through interconnectedness (Rochet & Tirole (1996); Billio, Getmansky, Lo, & Pelizzon 
(2012)) to bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig (1983)). In contrast to this literature, we simply revisit the 
bank fundamentals represented by an indirect utility function. 
3 Daníelsson, Jorgensen, & de Vries (2002) argue against trying to model the preferences of bank 
regulators/supervisors, as there is much publicly disclosed information available and, in addition, such 







Eurozone such losses persist until today. However, monetary policy, whether conventional or 
unconventional, reduces overall uncertainty and thereby bank risk aversion and bank output 
losses. As a result the ECB’s monetary policy appears to have moderated the loss of output due 
to uncertainty after the financial crisis (as in, e.g., Bekaert, Hoerova, & Lo Duca (2013)). 
Unfortunately, for some Member States, notably France and Germany, we observe some 
asymmetry in the impact of selected measures of unconventional monetary policy, such as main 
refinancing operations, on bank output losses. In this instance, unconventional monetary policy 
may actually enhance bank output losses. These results reveal the complexities and thereby the 
challenges involved in setting monetary policy to fit all across a currency union. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review on research of bank risk. Section 3 presents our theoretical model, and Section 4 
discusses the Eurozone banking industry and the data set. Section 5 reports and discusses the 
estimations, and Section 6 offers some concluding observations. 
2. Literature review on bank risk 
To this date, there is no universally accepted way of conceptualizing bank risk 
(Diamond & Dybvig (1983); Santomero (1997)), let alone of measuring it (Diamond & Rajan 
(2005); Brunnermeier (2009); Acharya, Schnabl, & Suarez (2013); Acharya & Mora (2015)); 
Dong, Firth, Hou, & Yang (2016); Delis, Iosifidi, & Tsionas (2017); Quaranta, Raffoni, & 
Visani (2018); Tsionas (2017); Glass and Kenjegalieva, (2019) and Badunenko & Kumbhakar 
(2017).4  This lack of consensus and understanding may be further compounded because 
‘traditional approaches have difficulty analyzing how risks can accumulate gradually and then 
suddenly erupt in a full blown crisis’ (Gray, Merton, & Bodie (2007)). 
There have been attempts of course to shed more light on bank risk. Going back to 
Santomero (1997) there is the argument that bank risk can either be related to financial assets 
that cannot be easily transferred to a third party − and due to this absence of secondary markets 
there is also no counterparty risk − or related to other assets and/or activities that are associated 
with high return (see also recent studies by Dong, Firth, Hou, & Yang (2016) and Delis, Iosifidi, 
& Tsionas (2017).5 
 
4  For measures of risk most often used in banking see Szegö (2002), Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & 
Mamatzakis (2009), Delis, Iosifidi, & Tsionas (2017) or Quaranta, Raffoni, & Visani (2018). Lehmann 
& Hofmann (2010) plead for ‘a pronounced external and forward looking approach to supplement the 
traditional methodology, which tends to be more inward looking and ultimately backward oriented’ 
regarding risk. Others have argued that a forward-looking approach brings into the picture irrelevant 
issues of forecasting volatility for example. Bauer & Ryser (2004) take a different approach as they focus 
on risk arising from deposits, which can lead to bank runs. In the event of such a run, liquidation costs 
arise. 
5 Following this argument, it is widely acknowledged that effective bank risk management to reduce risk 
exposure can be applied (see Decamps, Rochet, & Roger (2004); Acharya, Schnabl, & Suarez (2013); 
Acharya & Mora (2015)), though not always as effective as the circumstances would warrant (Diamond 
& Rajan (2005)). Then bank regulation and supervision needs to audit (e.g., Colliard (2018)), sanction 






To better understand systemic financial stability Elsinger, Lehar, & Summer (2006) for 
example develop a framework which relies mainly on easily observable market data and which 
provides an early warning system by computing the ‘value at risk’ for a lender of last resort. 
They find that the funds necessary to prevent contagion are surprisingly small.6 As in Elsinger, 
Lehar, & Summer (2006) other research on bank risk has evolved around the issues of early 
warning mechanisms and prediction of banking crises (e.g., Lawrence, Goodwin, O'Connor, & 
Önkal (2006); Barrell, Davis, Karim, & Liadze (2010); Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid (2012); El-
Shagi, Knedlik, & von Schweinitz (2013)). Lehar (2005) for example estimates the dynamics 
and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s 
portfolio, the individual liabilities that the regulator has vis-à-vis each bank are modeled as 
contingent claims on each bank’s assets. He finds that larger and more profitable banks have 
lower systemic risk and that additional equity capital reduces systemic risk but only for banks 
that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.7 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian (2011) on the other hand emphasize the 
importance of liquidity as they report that it dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable 
sources of financing, continued to lend more relative to other banks. Banks that held more 
illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. 
Off balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit 
origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. They conclude that 
 
(Bernanke (2006)). Bank ownership (e.g., Mohsni & Otchere (2014); Allen, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, & 
Kozłowski (2017)), governance (e.g., Vallascas, Mollah, & Keasey (2017)), managerial compensation 
(e.g., Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011)) and the internationalization of the bank (e.g., Allen N. Berger, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, & Roman (2017); Rajamani, Poel, Jong, & Ongena (2017)) may also play role. 
6  This research follows Basak & Shapiro (2001) who analyze optimal, dynamic portfolio and 
wealth/consumption policies of utility maximizing investors who must also manage market risk exposure 
using Value at Risk (VaR). They find that VaR risk managers often optimally choose a larger exposure 
to risky assets than non-risk managers and consequently incur larger losses when losses actually occur. 
They suggest an alternative risk management model, based on the expectation of a loss, to remedy the 
shortcomings of VaR. A general equilibrium analysis reveals that the presence of VaR risk managers 
amplifies the stock market volatility at times of “down markets” and attenuates the volatility at times of 
“up markets”. 
7 Kim & Santomero (1988) argue that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently 
priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing a 
mean variance model, the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to limit the 
insolvency risk of banks. The authors suggest, instead, to explicitly derive the ‘theoretically correct’ risk 
weights. In a recent paper, Glasserman & Kang (2014) propose an adaptive approach based upon the 
regulator would set weights as if he/she knew the true asset profitability of banks. Along similar lines, 
Kuritzkes, Schuermann, & Weiner (2005) consider the risk management problem faced by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) similarly to bank managing a loan portfolio, whilst in the FDIC’s 
case the risk arises from losses in banks. Stulz (1996) proposes, instead, that risk management is not 
there to dampen swings in corporate cash flows or value, but rather to provide protection against the 
possibility of costly lower tail outcomes, for example situations that would cause financial distress or 






efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.8 
As this review of the literature makes clear there are no (or few) structural models of 
bank risk based on micro foundations. In the next section we develop such a model. 
3. The bank’s indirect utility of profits 
Our paper builds on the expected utility of profit maximization as in Hughes, Mester, 
& Moon (2001). 9  Whilst Tsionas (2016) proposes a theoretical model with a Taylor 
approximation, we extend this analysis beyond the Taylor approximation as we focus on bank 
output price uncertainty (see also Tsionas (2017)). 
3.1. The general formulation 
The production technology is described by a general transformation function 
( ) 1F X Y  , where 
KX +  is a vector of inputs, 
MY +  is a vector of outputs. The 
transformation function describes how inputs are transformed into outputs. In the case of a 
single output, and a production function ( )Y X=  (which is by definition, a frontier) one 







 = , and the bank`s technology as 
follows:10 
𝑇 = {(𝑋, 𝑌)𝜖ℜ𝐾 × ℜ𝑀: 𝑋 and 𝑌 are technologically feasible} (1) 
Then, the bank would maximize the expected utility of profits: 
𝐸[𝑈(Π] = 𝐸[𝑈(𝑃𝑌 − 𝑊𝑋 − 𝐶)] (2) 
where C  represents fixed costs and U(Π) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of 
profit , with 0U  . The input prices 
KW +  are known to the bank, but output prices 
MP +  are not known before decisions are made, so there is uncertainty around output prices. 
Following Appelbaum & Ullah (1997), our basic stochastic assumption about bank 
 
8  Another strand of the literature examines the relationship between bank risk, as measured by 
nonperforming loans, and bank performance (e.g., Havrylchyk (2006); Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & 
Mamatzakis (2009); Mamatzakis, Tsionas, Kumbhakar, & Koutsomanoli-Filippaki (2015)). Atkinson & 
Dorfman (2005) highlight the importance of including indicators of output quality, i.e., nonperforming 
loans, in the cost function suggesting that otherwise the bank performance estimates are likely to be 
biased (see also Glass & Kenjegalieva (2019)). Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, & Molyneux (2011) assess 
the intertemporal relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European 
commercial banks employing several definitions of efficiency, capital and risk and using the Granger 
causality methodology in a panel data framework. Their estimates suggest that lower bank efficiency 
with respect to costs and revenues Granger causes higher bank risk and that increases in bank capital 
precede cost efficiency improvements. They find that more efficient banks eventually become better 
capitalized and that higher capital levels have a positive effect on efficiency. 
9 Hughes, Mester, & Moon (2001) show how to incorporate banks’ capital structure and risk taking into 
a model of production. In doing so, they bridge the gap that exists between the banking literature that 
studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of 
production and the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank 
production without explicitly considering how banks’ production decisions influence their riskiness. 
10 For simplicity of notation we shall not include indexes for time, bank and country. Please note that 






output prices is: 
P = m +e,  (3) 
where   represents expected prices, and   is a vector random variable whose distribution 
is ℱℰ, and has expectation a null vector.11 
The model generalizes Appelbaum & Ullah (1997) who considers the single output 
case in which there is only a single unknown output price. Using duality, the problem can be 
expressed in terms of indirect von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function as follows: 
( ) ( ) max ( ) s.t. ( ) 1.
K Mx y
V W C E U Y W X C F X Y  
+ +  
    =  + − −   M  (4) 
Here, M  denotes higher order moments of the distribution ℱℰ.  
Note that the functional form of ( )F X Y  is not known. Our specification for the indirect 
utility function in (4) is a flexible, translog, functional form (where small letters w p c   
represents logs of W P  and C  respectively):12 
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( ) ( ) 1 1j jm mE p z j J m M =   =   =   are moments. The moments are, in 
fact, conditional moments (viz. conditionally on z , that are weakly exogenous variables) 
whose construction is detailed below.13  
The specification in (5) is different from Appelbaum & Ullah (1997) who have used a 
restricted version of (5) in which maximization is performed under the assumption of cost 
minimization in which case the kx `s appear as arguments in (5). 
The bank`s risk aversion can be measured based on the notion that output prices are 
uncertain as in Appelbaum & Ullah (1997) using a simple device. From the first order 
conditions with respect to outputs of the indirect utility function 
 
11  Standard assumptions regarding the underlying data generating process of P are valid herein, 
regarding stationarity and existence of third and fourth moments. 
12 We drop   as an argument of V  as it is implicitly included in M . Please also note that in 
Appendix I we discuss in detail the application of the envelope theorem on the indirect utility function 
in (4) that yields input demands and output supply functions. 
13 The first moment 
(1)
m  is included in logs as it is always positive. We do not follow this rule for 






( ) ( ) max ( ) ( )
My
V W C M E U Y W Y C  
+
   =  + −  −C , where ( )W YC  is the usual (variable) cost 
function, we have: 
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Therefore, under risk aversion output will be lower and the converse is also true. Setting 
( ) 0 2jm j M =  =   in (6) results in the case with no uncertainty. If output is higher in the 
no-uncertainty case, then risk aversion is present. This is broadly consistent with Stiroh (2006) 
who finds that banks most reliant on activities that generate noninterest income do not earn 
higher average equity returns, and are much riskier as measured by return volatility (both total 
and idiosyncratic) and market betas. It is also consistent with Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux, & Seth 
(2000) who find that optimal bank size is considerably smaller when risk and quality factors 
are considered when modeling the cost characteristics of Japanese banks. This suggests that the 
pervasive shift towards noninterest income might not improve the risk/return outcomes 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & Mamatzakis (2009)). 
3.2. Parametric estimation 
 Following from the discussion of identifying shares of inputs and outputs, see equations 
(5) and the derivatives of (6), we estimate the following system of equations: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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1 21 1 1
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 (8) 
where   is a ( ) 1K M+   vector error term that we add for statistical purposes.15 
For simplicity, we include four moments for each one of the M output prices. 
 










, and therefore the 
expected marginal utility is 




  = 
  the denominator in equation (6).  
 
15 As the system is homogeneous of degree one in the parameters we impose the identification constraint 









The very last term in (5) captures interactions between moments of order j  and j  (
1j j J =  ) for the various log output prices mp  and mp   ( 1m m M =  ). 
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where ( ) ( )1( ) i i





 = K K , ( )K  is a kernel function and h  is 
the scalar bandwidth parameter and z are bank specific variables considered as weakly 
exogenous to the cost function (for example total loans, other earning assets and off 
balance sheet items and fees). Following standard practice, we take (4 )Dh n− +=  when 
the data is normalized by their standard deviations. As z  is a vector we use a product 
kernel, 
1





=K K  where for ( )K  we use an Epanechnikov kernel. For 








p z j J
=
=   =    (10) 
The asymptotic correctness of these estimators is established in Singh & Tracy 
(1970). 
Further, in a second stage we want to relate these moments to measures of conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy. As the moments are estimated non-parametrically, 
estimating a relation between moments and measures of monetary policy, in two stages, is 
known to yield biased and inconsistent results. To solve the problem we use a bootstrap. The 
bootstrap approach we use has been introduced, in a different setting, by Simar & Wilson 
(2007). The relationship of moments to measures of monetary policy is given by a panel VAR 
model which we detail in Part III of Appendix where we also detail our bootstrap technique. 
Notice that we cannot drop an equation from this system as shares do not add up to 
unity. To simplify notation, we omit the observation index, which is, in fact, 1i B=   for 
individual banks and 1 it T=   for time. 
From duality theory it follows that the indirect utility function, V , must be non-
decreasing in input prices and fixed costs (W C ) and non-increasing in expected output prices
(1)
m . To comply with the theory the following specific constraints should be valid: 
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We do not use maximum likelihood as this requires questionable normality and 
homoskedasticity assumptions in (9) and (10). Instead, we opt for the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), which, however, cannot be used under the observation-specific constraints 
(11) to (13). To address this, we impose, first, the restrictions (11) to (13) at the sample means 
x . For simplicity in presentation, let 
( )[ ]jit it it m itw C   =  x . We then apply the continuously 
updated estimator (CUE) version of GMM (see Hansen, Heaton, & Yaron (1996)).16 We refer 
to Part IV of the Appendix for more discussion of this issue. 
We keep adding constraints at the points  x s  (where the vector of standard 
deviations is denoted by s for 0 1 0 2 =      until 99% of the data satisfy the constraints. 
Eventually, almost all data points satisfy the constraints for 1 7 =  . Our instruments are input 
prices, all four observation specific moments of P and country, bank and time effects. In the 
list of instruments we include squares and cross products of all input prices, all four moments 
of P as well as all cross product terms along with cross product terms with bank-specific and 
time-specific effects. Time effects are introduced to account for other exogenous shifts in the 
demand functions. Hansen (1982)’s J statistic for testing the over identifying restrictions had 
a p -value no less than 0.30 in all cases for which we present empirical results. Moments are 
estimated using (9) where z  includes total loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet 
items and fees, a measure of consumer’s income (real GDP per capita), a measure of prices of 
other commodities (the GDP deflator), as well as country and time effects. 
In Appendix II we present in detail the non-parametric approach to estimating bank 
risk aversion. In the empirical section, we shall present parametric and non-parametric 
estimations, whilst we also compare the fitness of the two estimations. 
2.3. Bank risk aversion measure 
Following Gray, Merton, & Bodie (2007) who consider the difficulties to account for 
bank risk in some detail, we propose herein to identify such risk through modeling bank risk 
aversion, opting for a micro foundation approach. 
The starting point is to focus on demand and supply elasticities, with respect to output 
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16 We used the filterSD software which is written in Fortran77 and is released as open source code under 
the Eclipse Public License (EPL). It is available from the COINOR initiative. The code has been written 






















































=D , and 1jj =  if m m=  and 
zero otherwise is Kronecker’s delta. 
These elasticities are meaningful empirical outcomes of the model. Equation (14) 
provides input demand elasticities with respect to moments of the bank output price 
distribution. More importantly, (15) provides elasticities of bank outputs mY  with respect to 
the various moments 
( )j
m . These in the generalized sense are 
( )















a way of identifying uncertainty regarding bank output prices. 
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= = −   =  
 D D
 (17) 
It must be noted that cross price elasticities of input demand are not symmetric and 
under uncertainty they may not have the same sign. Moreover, demand and supply functions 
that are upward sloping with respect to expected output prices but downward sloping with 
respect to second moments of prices, are consistent with risk averse banks with decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. That is to say that demand for bank inputs would increase as the expected 
bank output prices increase, and the same follows for bank supply, but on the other hand an 
increase in the volatility of bank output would result to a decline in both bank input demand 
and bank supply. 
To compute output under the assumption of no uncertainty we use (10) and impose the 
restrictions that it is linearly homogeneous with respect to 
(1)w c  . Note that 1VC


= −  and 
moments of order 2j J=   disappear from the model. Output ‘shares’ can be computed 
from (17) and therefore expected or fitted outputs can be computed under the no-risk case, 
denoted as 
mY . Under risk (i.e., in output prices), then we could, also, compute from (17) 
expected or fitted outputs as ˆmY . Under bank risk aversion, we expect that 
, or 
 
in log terms. To see by how much output 
would decrease we follow: 
 (18) 







Equation (18) provides a measure of bank output loss due to uncertainty in output 
prices. As we observe bank output with uncertainty and without the computation of bank output 
loss is straight forward. This measure provides an overall measure of the effects of uncertainty 
and thereby also an direct way of counting for the effects of bank risk aversion. In the empirical 
application, one could employ (18) so as to measure bank risk aversion as time-varying, bank-
specific and/or country specific.17 In Appendix II we present an extension to this measure 
based on a non-parametric estimation method. 
Note that this is the first time that such a bank-specific risk aversion measure is 
proposed. In addition, by estimating equation (18) and thereby monitoring bank risk aversion 
and thus bank output loss based on micro foundations, we develop a novel early warning 
mechanism about possible financial crisis. Higher level of bank losses due to uncertainty in 
bank output prices would indicate that banks are facing high risk that they attempt to 
accommodate through higher risk aversion. 
There is some discussion in the literature (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & Mamatzakis 
(2009); Mamatzakis, Tsionas, Kumbhakar, & Koutsomanoli-Filippaki (2015)) that bank 
managers, whether because of their own preferences or due to the enforcement of prudential 
regulation/supervision, would face large operating costs and as a result they would opt to settle 
for lower bank output, which can take the form of bank loans, other earning assets and off 
balance sheet items and fees. We build on this hypothesis and in particular we provide a 
framework where we estimate bank output (of the aforementioned three types) under risk and 
without risk. Moreover, in the current framework we provide a measure of bank risk aversion, 
based on the loss of bank output due to uncertainty in output prices. The higher the uncertainty 
of bank output prices of equation (18), the higher the loss of bank output. 
 
4. The Eurozone financial crisis and the bank data set 
4.1. The Eurozone financial crisis: An on-going saga 
While the financial crisis started in the US in 2007, its impact was not felt in the 
Eurozone earlier than the end of 2008.18 There were also significant lags in the Eurozone 
 
17 Most of the banking literature has focused on risk as the latter derives from one particular bank output, 
that is problem loans. There are several hypotheses regarding problem loans; if problem loans are 
exogenous then we have the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis, if endogenous to bank management then the ‘bad 
management’ or ‘skimping’ (Allen N. Berger & DeYoung (1997)). The aforementioned hypotheses have 
also led to ‘moral hazard’ hypothesis (Gorton & Rosen (1995)), counting for the case that under-
capitalized banks could issue further loans, some risky, so as to enhance counterparty risk. 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & Mamatzakis (2009) test for these hypotheses and find evidence for the ‘moral 
hazard’ hypothesis in EU. To this day, no analysis has been proposed to deal with the micro foundations 
of bank output, and thereby bank loans. Our model shows that the bank output price uncertainty would 
lead to bank output losses. 
18 During 2007 it became clear that the financial industry in US was experiencing an unprecedented, 






response to the financial crisis. Some financial assistance was provided to entroubled Member 
States through the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010. A few years later in 
September 2012, the EFSF was succeeded by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with 
the ambition to provide financial assistance to Member States of the Eurozone. 
With some considerable lags the ECB also applied quantitative and qualitative easing, 
along with conventional and unconventional monetary policy. It was only on July 26th, 2012, 
that Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, in his now famous Speech at the 
Global Investment Conference in London stated that ‘within our mandate, the ECB is ready to 
do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.“ Since then the 
ECB also announced a bond-buying operation, i.e., the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). 
Such transactions have not been entirely convincing as the state of the Eurozone banking is still 
raising serious concerns. For example, the Greek debt crisis continues to fester and Eurozone 
banks’ exposures to risk taking, and more recently their bond borrowing, have raised doubts of 
how sound the financial markets in the Eurozone are. 
A simple way of depicting the state of financial instability in the Eurozone over the 
years is to look at the long-term interest rate for 10-year maturity sovereign bonds (see Figure 
1). Interest rates converged prior to the launch of Euro in 2001 and remained at low levels for 
some considerable time until late in 2009. Since then we have witnessed some unprecedented 
hikes for some Member States of the Eurozone, notably in the periphery. These hikes appear to 
persist for some years, though with the exception of Greece there is some convergence since 
2014. Note, that the financial crisis exposed a division between Member States of the Eurozone, 
despite some nominal convergence prior to the euro. There was clear evidence of a divergence 
in sovereign, but also corporate spreads across the Eurozone, with the periphery of the Eurozone 
reporting hikes in spreads in the period from 2010 to 2013, whilst the opposite is true for 
northern Member States (see Figure 1). Hikes in spreads in the periphery led to successive bank 
bail outs of large scale, and in one occasion bail in (see the case of Cyprus). In the following 
order, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (and most recently Cyprus) did apply for financial 
assistance from EU Commission, and the International Monetary Fund, whereas the ECB 
provided technical support.19 In addition, Spain also benefited from financial assistance from 
 
Netherlands, the market remained surprisingly resilient. However following, the Greek elections in 
October 2009 fiscal deficit figures were upwardly revised fourfold within a period of a quarter. Possible 
sovereign defaults within the Eurozone suddenly became a reality. The spread for the five-years Greek 
sovereign bonds rose from 215 basis points above the swap rate in December 2009 to almost 2,000 basis 
points in April 2010. Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish spreads also rocketed with their banking 
industry being severely strained. The dramatic rises in sovereign bonds spreads in the Eurozone opened 
the ongoing debate over the viability of the euro. 
19 Spain did not formally applied for financial assistance, yet its banking industry faced big losses due 
to the burst of the local property bubble. In Spain, only Bankia received funds in excess of 25 billion 
euros to stay afloat, with the total bill of the banking industry bail-out in the region is in excess of 100 






the Eurozone. Overall, the Eurozone bank crisis proves to be very costly, ex post much more 
so when compared to the bailouts in US. So far more than 600 billion euros were allocated to 





Figure 1: Long-term interest rate, sovereign bonds of 10-year maturity in the 
Eurozone 
 
Notes. The data are obtained from the ECB and are at a monthly frequency. 
Alas, despite some considerable scale of financial assistance to the Eurozone banking 
industry, though not without significant lags compared to USA and UK, it is still uncertain 
whether there is firewall to safeguard the viability of the financial markets in the Eurozone and 
the banking industry in particular. The ECB program of monetary expansion since 2010 has 
progressively become more extensive and has involved mostly conventional, and in recent 
years unconventional monetary policy.20 The ECB lowered interest rates across the board 
including the rate on the deposit facility, which banks may use to make overnight deposits with 
the Eurosystem, and the rate on the marginal lending facility, which offers overnight credit to 
banks from the Eurosystem. ECB also engaged in an unprecedented unconventional monetary 
policy program with the starting point being the Enhanced Credit Support in June 2009, and 
the Securities Markets Program in May 2010. Moreover, the Securities Markets Program 
(SMP), the Covered Bond Purchase Program 1 (CBPP1), and the Covered Bond Purchase 
 
industry from the EU. The case of Ireland is worth mentioning as its banking industry faced also with a 
loss of 100 billion euros, mostly related to defaulted mortgages. As a consequence the Irish banking 
industry had to be bailed out. 
20  In the Spring 2015 the ECB introduced as part of the so called ‘expanded asset purchasing 
programme’ the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), the asset-backed securities purchase 
programme (ABSPP), the public sector purchase programme (PSPP), and the corporate sector purchase 
programme (CSPP). Such ECB policies are officially designed to tackle low inflation. Yet, it is also the 
case that such policies would qualify as unconventional monetary policy. And this unconventional 






Program 2 (CBPP2) were terminated in 2012.21 The SMP amounted to € 240 billion and was 
designed as an intervention in the Eurozone public and private debt securities markets. Such 
interventions were assumed to be sterilised so as not to affect the monetary policy stance 
overall. The CBPP1 amounted to € 60 billion and reflected purchases in primary and secondary 
markets of covered bonds eligible for use as collateral for Eurozone credit operations. The 
CBPP2 amounted to € 40 billion and focused on covered bonds with a residual maturity of 10.5 
years. These programs were followed by the expanding Asset Purchase Program (APP), which 
up until May 2016 contained: The third Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP3), the Asset-
Backed Securities Purchase Program (ABSPP), the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), 
and the Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP). As part of unconventional monetary policy 
we also take into account longer-term refinancing operations and marginal lending facility 
programmes.22 
In addition, the Eurozone is focusing on enhancing the homogeneity and the integration of 
the banking industry by accelerating the process towards a Eurozone banking union. As part of 
this process a new institution, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was established, 
aiming to provide unified bank supervision across Eurozone Member States. In parallel, failing 
banks will be managed by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which is yet to be activated 
as board selection is pending.23 Following the above, it might not come as a surprise that we 
shall apply our bank risk aversion model to the Eurozone. That would be the first time that 
effects of uncertainty regarding output prices in the Eurozone banking industry would be 
revealed. 
4.2. The Eurozone bank data set 
Given these striking developments the Eurozone is a region of particular interest to 
examine bank risk-taking. In this study, we employ a comprehensive data set based on IBCA 
Bankscope and Orbis Bank Focus that contains all commercial, cooperative, savings, and 
investment banks operating in the Eurozone between 2001 and 2015. We examine the database 
for any reporting errors and other inconsistencies and end up with an unbalanced panel of 
39,681 observations, which comprises 5,017 different banks. As a result our data set is a panel 
data set that has both time and cross section dimension. Also note, that the sample period is 
 
21 The dates for the Securities Market Program were from 05/2010 to 06/9/2012, for the Covered Bond 
Purchase Program 1 from 06/2009 to 06/2010, and last for Covered Bond Purchase Program 2 from 
11/2011 to 10/2012. 
22 Part of unconventional monetary policy could be the fine-tuning (structural) reverse operations. 
However, such operations have been rather limited. 
23 As part of SSM mandate an extensive exercise of bank ‘stress tests’ were carried out in 2014. This 
exercise was rather comprehensive, covering 130 banks with €22.0 trillion of total assets, near to 82% of 
total assets in the SSM. It revealed that some 25 billion euros of additional capital should be raised. There 
has been some open criticism on the accuracy of such capital shortage. However, fact remains that the 
bank crisis has been lingering ever since, possible suggesting that previous recapitalisations did little to 






sufficiently long and covers also the aftermath of the financial crisis that would provide 
information on whether bank risk has been subdued since the financial meltdown in 2008 and 
following ECB’s interventions. 
Moreover, as we derive our bank risk measure based on the duality theory we employ 
− what is now standard in the literature − the “financial intermediation approach” (see Sealey 
& Lindley (1977)) for determining bank inputs and outputs.24 Based on this approach, banks 
act as intermediates and thereby have deposits, by employing labor, physical and financial 
capital, and thereafter produce three bank outputs that cover the vast majority of banking 
activity: loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees. 
Descriptive statistics of the data set are provided in Table 1. All figures are in Euro 
thousands. For this study we focus on Member States of the Eurozone (i.e., that were Members 
during the crisis), i.e., Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the bank balance sheet variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total assets 9,314,117 75,600,000 28,300 2,250,000,000 
Loans 4,585,979 32,400,000 9,000 1,190,000,000 
Other earning assets 4,208,908 41,900,000 6,700 1,760,000,000 
Overheads 126,647 974,880 700 29,800,000 
Personnel expenses 68,812 537,141 5,000 16,100,000 
Operational Expenses 58,020 447,720 6,000 15,100,000 
Total interest expenses 214,017 1,776,076 8,000 99,500,000 
Total interest income 327,101 2,476,853 1,100 103,000,000 
Total non-interest income 73,623 628,892 3,000 21,500,000 
Liquid assets 2,206,915 22,900,000 2,400 1,020,000,000 
Total securities 3,059,906 35,100,000 4,900 1,700,000,000 
Cash and claims on banks 197,011 2,299,746 5,731 118,000,000 
Off balance sheet items 1,265,483 17,400,000 16,400 2,330,000,000 
Total customer deposits 3,647,544 27,200,000 8,582 1,170,000,000 
Other deposits 1,728,755 13,300,000 6,000 665,000,000 
Total liabilities 8,857,807 72,400,000 22,900 2,160,000,000 
Equity to total assets 8.17 6.60 1.95 100.00 
Net interest revenue 120,818 940,665 1,400 32,500,000 
Loan loss provisions 32,233 330,343 -15,500 18,500,000 
Loan loss reserves 334,590 1,604,379 3,000 35,900,000 
Nonperforming loans 560,443 3,016,797 14,100 77,400,000 
 
24 For a review of the various approaches that have been proposed in the literature for the definition of 






Net interest margin 2.52 1.12 0.21 5.61 
Operating profit 34,855 433,895 -69,000 12,500,000 
Return to assets 0.33 1.43 -2.63 44.84 
Return to equity 4.32 16.97 -1.96 775.51 
 Notes. The table reports descriptive statistics for all bank balance sheet variables. All amounts 
are in euros, except all ratios which are in percent. The sample covers the period 2001 to 2015 
and contains 39,681 observations for 5,017 different banks from Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain. 
 
In our analysis we consider three different inputs, i.e., physical capital, labor and 
financial capital, and three outputs, i.e., loans, other earning assets (which include government 
securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs, T-bills, and equity investment), and off balance 
sheet items and fees. In line with previous studies (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki & Mamatzakis 
(2009); Mamatzakis, Tsionas, Kumbhakar, & Koutsomanoli-Filippaki (2015)) we define the 
price of physical capital as other administrative expenses to fixed assets, of labor as personnel 
expenses to total assets, of financial capital as the total interest expenses over total interest 
bearing borrowed funds. Regarding bank output prices, the price of loans is the interest income 
from loans, the price of other earning assets is the income from other earning assets (i.e., 
government securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs, T-bills, and equity investment), and 
lastly for the price of off balance sheet items and fees we employ the non-interest income. We 
take as fixed cost the value of total fixed assets. We also include in our analysis variables such 
as loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves, and non-performing loans to directly take into 
account problem loans into our modeling. Other bank-specific variables that we consider are: 
equity to total assets, bank size (see e.g. Beccalli, Anolli, & Borello (2015)), net interest 
revenue, and net interest margin. 
In terms of monetary policy, we measure ECB’s conventional monetary policy by the rate 
on the deposit facility at which banks may use to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem 
(DEP) and the rate on the Marginal Lending Facility which offers overnight credit to banks 
from the Eurozone (MLFr). Unconventional monetary policy includes the Securities Markets 
Program (SMP) together with the Covered Bond Purchase Program 1 (CBPP1), and the 
Covered Bond Purchase Program 2 (CBPP2) (SEC). In addition, we include the main 
Refinancing operations (REFIN); Longer-term Refinancing operations (LTREFIN). Lastly, we 
take also into account the Marginal Lending Facility (MLF) Program. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Parametric and non-parametric input and output elasticities  






which is the sample mean of the data.25 Table 2 presents the results. Elasticities IjE  denote 
an elasticity of input I {K L F}    standing for physical capital, labor and financial capital 
with respect to the jth moment ( 1 4j =  ) in the output price.26 
Results show that all input elasticities are positive with respect to the first moment, the 
expected output price, and turn negative with respect to the second moment, the volatility of 
the output price. This implies that for all inputs, that is physical capital, labor and financial 
capital, an increase in the expected output price would also increase the demand for inputs, but 
higher volatility in output price would lead to lower demand. Similarly, it is reported that the 
third and fourth moment is positive and negative, respectively. In Appendix II, we report also 
non-parametric estimation of input and output elasticities. Appendix’s Table A.1 presents 
results on input elasticities at the point of approximation, which is the sample mean of the data 
using the non-parametric estimation as explained by the local log likelihood function (in 
equation (A.9) in Appendix II) for the linear local fit case. 
 
To assist the presentation we report herein results for the periphery that includes 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and separately for France, Germany and Greece. This 
grouping is simply for presentation purposes. All other results are available upon request. Input 
elasticities with respect to output prices are all positive and significant in line with the 
parametric estimations. Note that the higher the volatility of output prices, the lower the demand 
for bank inputs as the elasticity of inputs with respect to the second moment is negative. The 
elasticities with respect to the third and fourth moments are positive and negative, respectively. 
These elasticities are, generally, quite different across the three sub-periods. In line with the 
parametric estimations, demand for bank inputs during the credit crunch is significantly lower 
than prior to the crisis. These results reveal that during the crisis uncertainty regarding bank 
output prices has severe effects on bank inputs demand. 
Given the underlying time dimension of our sample, Figure 2 shows the input 
elasticities with respect to the 1st moment of the output price over time. To facilitate the 
presentation we present figures for some selected Eurozone Member States, that is Member 
States in the periphery and some north/central Eurozone Member States. Clearly, there is 
variability across Member States regarding the demand for bank inputs during the credit crunch, 
though an overall decline is noted. There is a pronounced drop in the demand for physical 
 
25 Note, that we take into account heterogeneity across various bank specifications in the indirect utility 
function V in (11), which is a flexible, translog functional form, by including dummies for commercial, 
cooperative, savings and investment banks. In addition, to capture heterogeneity across countries in the 
Eurozone, we also incorporate country dummies. 
26  To facilitate the presentation of results standard errors (which show that input elasticities are 






capital (blue line), followed by financial capital (green line), in large Member States (see 
France, Germany and Italy). For Member States in the periphery, i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Spain 
and Greece, labour demand did also decline around financial crisis. Notice that demand for 
financial capital increase for Netherlands (and to less extent for Portugal) during the main 
period of financial crisis, that is 2008 to 2011, yet it drops thereafter.27 The decline in demand 
for labor, physical and financial capital is noticeable for all Member States in the Eurozone, but 
it is quite considerable for the periphery, i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. One of 
the revelations of the financial crisis is related to the time horizon of the financial cycle. It is 
argued that the bust periods of a financial cycle last much longer, compared with those in a 
business cycle (Aikman, Haldane, & Nelson (2015); Borio, Disyatat, & Juselius (2017)). 
Our results provide, for the first time, evidence of the prolonged bust period of financial 
cycle based on bank input demand. Certainly, there is some recovery in bank input demand 
over the period 2012-2015, but this is rather anemic, whereas for some Member States negative 
trends in bank input demand persist (see Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal). Indeed, there is evidence of “multi-dipping” in the demand for bank 
inputs. Also it is worth noting that demand for labor is negative, in particular during and after 
the crisis for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The value added of our results comes from 
the understanding that the financial crisis has shifted downwards bank input demand also in 
France and Germany, countries that are widely considered not to have been severely subjected 
to the effects of the crisis compared to the periphery. Yet, we reveal that based on micro 
foundations evidence that this is not the case. Eurozone banking industry is still facing the 
effects of uncertainty. 
Figure 2: Input elasticities with respect to first moment over time 
 
27 Note that the Netherlands had to respond and bail out banks earlier than other Member States in the 
Eurozone, the elasticity of financial capital with respect to expected bank output price reflects this. Since 







Notes. Elasticities are estimated for each of the inputs, K, L and F, with respect to 1st moment of output 
prices. These elasticities stand as EK1 for physical capital (blue line), EL1 for labor (red line) and EF1 
for financial capital (green line). 
 
In Table 3 we report output elasticities OjE , where 𝑂 ∈ {𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠, 𝑂𝐸𝐴, 𝑂𝐵𝑆} 
standing for loans, other earning assets (OEA) and off balance sheet items and fees (OBS), with 
respect to the jth price moment ( 1 4j =  ). Output elasticities are at the point of 
approximation, which is the sample mean of the data. Results show that higher expected output 
prices increase the supply of bank loans, bank other earning assets and off balance sheet items 
and fees, but that this effect is subdued during the credit crunch, whereas volatility in output 
prices has the opposite outcome. Output elasticities with respect to the 3rd and 4th moment are, 
as expected, positive and negative respectively. These output elasticities reveal similar patterns 
to input elasticities. Non-parametric estimations of output elasticities confirm the above and are 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































The reported findings suggest that the Eurozone banking industry has been subject to 
some severe head winds as both bank input demand and bank output supply have been disrupted 
as a result of the financial crisis, and there is some persistence in recent years too. As this 
destruction was exacerbated by the credit crunch, the results show that the Eurozone banking 
industry has faced escalating uncertainties in bank output prices and that thereby bank risk 
aversion has been increasing. In addition, bank uncertainty regarding bank output prices has 
much more detrimental effects on bank input demand and bank outputs since the onset of the 
crisis. 
5.2. Loss of bank output due to uncertainty in output prices  
As we detect some variability over time and across Member States of the Eurozone in 
bank input demand and output supply since the financial crisis, we now turn to estimating any 
loss of bank output due to changes in bank risk aversion triggered by the uncertainty in output 
prices. To this end, we employ equation (25). The results of bank loss of output are reported in 
Table 4 as mD , where m = loans, OEA (Other Earning Assets) or OBS (Off Balance Sheet 
items and fees). Since logs are used the measures are in percentage terms.28 Any deviations 
from risk neutrality towards risk aversion due to uncertainty in output prices would lead to loss 
of output. Thus, bank outputs under certainty should be higher than under uncertainty. This 
implies that the larger the estimates of mD  the higher the loss of output due to uncertainty in 
output prices. 
 
28 Standard errors are available upon request. All estimations of the loss of output are significant at the 
5% level. 
Elasticity (EOj) of Output (O)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Austria 0.38 -0.59 0.19 -0.63 0.04 -0.27 -0.08 0.03 0.46 -0.38 0.31 -0.21
Belgium 1.00 -0.44 0.23 -0.17 0.25 -0.53 0.16 -0.18 0.44 -0.19 0.37 -0.17
Cyprus 0.48 -0.53 0.16 -0.32 -0.12 -0.27 0.09 -0.12 0.63 -0.45 0.40 -0.31
Finland 0.30 -0.62 0.32 -0.33 0.19 -0.40 0.32 -0.24 0.49 -0.19 0.30 -0.20
France 1.00 -0.67 0.30 -0.43 0.23 -0.34 0.26 0.11 0.56 -0.38 0.54 -0.18
Germany 0.82 -0.49 0.12 -0.13 0.25 -0.42 0.37 -0.28 0.48 -0.20 0.55 -0.40
Greece 2.10 -0.03 1.90 -0.20 -0.06 -0.35 0.25 -0.48 0.51 -0.43 0.33 -0.14
Italy 2.30 -0.29 1.50 -0.16 0.38 -0.39 -0.12 -0.40 0.49 -0.23 0.32 -0.13
Ireland 2.30 -0.36 1.80 -0.44 0.29 -0.05 0.25 -0.64 0.50 -0.23 0.47 -0.37
Luxembourg 0.88 -0.60 0.28 -0.29 -0.03 -0.71 0.53 0.02 0.74 -0.31 0.27 -0.15
Malta 0.58 -0.66 0.40 -0.43 0.02 -0.22 0.43 -0.06 0.53 -0.38 0.55 -0.15
the Netherlands 2.30 -0.33 1.70 -0.29 0.45 -0.57 0.01 -0.40 0.55 -0.51 0.33 -0.18
Portugal 2.20 -0.34 1.60 -0.38 0.17 -0.39 0.09 -0.35 0.58 -0.52 0.38 -0.30
Slovenia 0.58 -0.71 0.47 -0.39 0.25 -0.18 0.20 -0.29 0.48 -0.26 0.30 -0.26
Spain 1.90 -0.34 1.70 -0.37 0.20 -0.10 -0.04 -0.40 0.54 -0.44 0.33 -0.26
Austria 0.61 -0.57 0.27 -0.62 0.61 -0.062 0.54 -0.28 0.34 -0.46 0.18 0.023
Belgium 0.82 -1 0.21 -0.63 0.18 -0.074 0.74 -0.14 0.44 -0.24 0.42 -0.23
Cyprus 0.66 -0.59 0.35 -0.46 0.57 -0.11 0.31 -0.37 0.71 -0.21 0.36 -0.025
Finland 0.47 -0.59 0.32 -0.098 0.17 -0.44 0.5 -0.27 0.22 -0.51 0.56 -0.09
France 0.86 -0.36 0.087 -0.69 0.17 -0.23 0.3 -0.36 0.34 -0.38 0.43 -0.25
Germany 0.57 -0.34 0.38 -0.19 0.11 -0.12 0.22 -0.63 0.42 -0.54 0.51 -0.29
Greece 1.1 -0.071 1.2 -0.37 0.31 -0.83 0.15 -0.65 0.64 -0.16 0.28 -0.09
Italy 1.2 -0.072 0.99 -0.15 -0.18 -0.36 0.78 -0.67 0.48 -0.29 0.32 -0.35
Ireland 1.5 -0.25 1 -0.12 0.18 -0.89 0.21 -1 0.44 -0.086 0.34 -0.23
Luxembourg 1 -0.82 0.28 -0.66 0.5 -0.12 0.32 -0.25 0.55 -0.32 0.49 -0.23
Malta 0.86 -0.66 0.32 -0.26 0.32 -0.19 0.13 -0.23 0.27 -0.28 0.52 -0.092
the Netherlands 0.82 -0.0094 1.3 -0.13 0.23 -0.81 0.35 -0.83 0.44 -0.4 0.46 -0.21
Portugal 1.3 -0.29 0.95 -0.31 0.073 -0.71 0.49 -0.72 0.6 -0.11 0.65 -0.33
Slovenia 0.81 -0.27 0.41 -0.56 0.19 -0.21 0.44 -0.48 0.56 -0.22 0.49 -0.33
Spain 1 -0.027 1.2 -0.2 0.18 -0.59 0.37 -0.43 0.44 -0.14 0.53 -0.3
Austria 0.62 -0.55 0.18 -0.49 0.088 -0.15 0.16 -0.41 0.48 -0.34 0.54 -0.32
Belgium 0.94 -0.55 0.37 -0.35 0.06 -0.014 0.49 -0.063 0.64 -0.41 0.47 -0.073
Cyprus 0.64 -0.53 0.5 -0.46 0.39 -0.18 0.36 -0.14 0.49 -0.41 0.67 -0.24
Finland 0.78 -0.57 0.47 -0.41 0.083 -0.5 0.51 -0.32 0.33 -0.36 0.62 -0.048
France 1.1 -0.49 0.38 -0.67 0.28 -0.27 0.46 -0.22 0.43 -0.34 0.12 -0.21
Germany 0.63 -0.37 0.3 -0.51 0.24 -0.24 0.44 -0.22 0.51 -0.25 0.26 -0.17
Greece 1.8 -0.27 1.7 -0.32 0.35 -0.81 0.2 -0.38 0.4 -0.27 0.41 -0.3
Italy 1.9 -0.19 1.6 -0.14 0.23 -0.58 0.43 -0.6 0.64 -0.28 0.36 -0.34
Ireland 1.8 -0.39 1.2 -0.46 0.13 -0.56 0.2 -0.74 0.7 -0.31 0.49 -0.2
Luxembourg 1.7 -0.022 1.4 -0.21 0.31 -0.78 0.14 -0.5 0.47 -0.32 0.47 -0.2
Malta 0.78 -0.54 0.45 -0.6 0.21 -0.39 0.27 -0.21 0.61 -0.14 0.22 -0.32
the Netherlands 0.86 -0.52 0.41 -0.052 0.18 -0.53 0.36 -0.021 0.75 -0.47 0.65 -0.29
Portugal 1.7 -0.24 1.5 -0.23 0.2 -0.6 0.26 -0.46 0.51 -0.38 0.38 -0.11
Slovenia 0.55 -0.91 0.27 -0.54 0.17 -0.17 0.43 -0.062 0.4 -0.39 0.36 -0.27
Spain 1.6 -0.4 1.5 -0.25 0.3 -0.72 0.031 -0.39 0.46 -0.45 0.51 -0.29




Notes. The table reports the estimates of the elasticities of the output with respect to the j
th
 moment.
Off Balance Sheet (OBS)Loans (L) Other Earning Assets (OEA)







Table 4 shows that, indeed, in all sub-periods we have considerable loss of bank output, 
both in terms of bank loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees. This loss 
is aggravated during the 2008-2009 financial crisis period. The loss of bank output is 
quantitatively important, i.e., close to 20% for France and 24% for Germany (the largest 
Eurozone Member States) during the period 2008-2011. This is also the case for other Member 
States of the Eurozone, with that of Spain being rather striking as bank loans (but also other 
earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees) under certainty in Spain would have been 
around 28% higher during the crisis from 2008 to 2011. Note that bank loss of output for the 
Eurozone is also identified prior to the crisis, during the period 2001-2007, when the average 
loss of bank output during the bank risk aversion is around 11%. Alas, during the crisis period 
these losses doubled. 
Worryingly, for some Member States in the Eurozone the output losses persist well 
after the crisis, that is from 2012 to 2015, notably in the case of Greece (and to a less extend 
for Ireland and Spain) for which the losses have been aggravated. For Greece there is a further 
loss of bank output of up to 25% (28%) for bank loans (other earning assets and off balance 
sheet items and fees) in the period 2012-2015. Also, not surprisingly the Spanish bank losses 
are the highest of all, i.e., 28% during the crisis, whilst there is some recovery of Spanish bank 
output losses in recent years.29 The Irish banking industry is also of interest as the subprime 
crisis has revealed its dire state, that is proving hard to fix. Our results show that bank losses in 
Ireland persist also well after the financial crisis and despite the Irish banking industry have 








29 Greece still faces strong conditionality and non-access to financial markets, while Spanish banking 
industry was severely rocked by scandals but now seems on the road to recovery. 
Loss in Output, in % Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS
Austria 10.176 8.362 21.910 22.172 10.518 6.065 9.498 12.438 7.303
Belgium 14.465 9.266 21.562 21.602 10.546 6.567 9.318 12.398 7.441
Cyprus 11.982 7.792 21.925 22.345 11.856 7.313 9.328 12.180 7.197
Finland 14.359 9.515 21.351 21.143 10.627 6.637 9.399 12.473 7.220
France 10.974 7.407 19.857 19.753 12.022 6.477 9.399 12.529 7.393
Germany 12.322 3.216 23.471 23.508 12.177 6.542 9.370 12.407 7.278
Greece 10.593 11.700 22.871 22.945 24.871 28.029 9.473 12.446 7.419
Italy 12.156 16.279 21.368 21.085 11.280 13.868 9.537 12.233 7.423
Ireland 7.538 12.098 20.278 20.190 19.645 18.779 9.330 12.297 7.165
Luxembourg 13.947 6.850 22.427 22.357 11.259 6.354 9.493 12.487 7.632
Malta 11.540 7.851 22.233 22.577 10.734 5.667 9.518 12.362 7.421
the Netherlands 12.989 6.977 21.778 21.739 10.662 5.742 9.375 12.421 7.882
Portugal 8.777 12.834 20.966 21.193 16.885 22.572 9.438 12.287 7.341
Slovenia 13.306 8.051 18.996 19.127 9.950 11.719 9.427 12.300 7.499
Spain 8.093 14.165 28.305 28.400 13.615 16.740 9.198 12.373 7.634
Table 4. Bank loss of output due to risk: parametric estimation
Notes. The table reports the loss of output calculated with equation (25) which represents the difference of output between the no-
uncertainty (full information) case and the uncertainty case, and which can be interpreted as the change in bank risk aversion.









Figure 3: Bank loss of output: parametric estimation over time 
 
Notes. Bank risk aversion represents loss of output as derived from (25); the difference of output between 
the no-uncertainty case (full information) and the uncertainty case. FR is France, DE is Germany, ES is 
Spain, AU is Austria, IRE is Ireland, GR is Greece, ITA is Italy and PT is Portugal and NED is 
Netherlands. Loans is the loss of loans, OEA is the loss in other earning assets, whilst OBS is off balance 
sheet items and fees, all in % terms. 
 
Figure 3 reveals that bank losses of output as a result of higher uncertainty in prices 
peaked during the crisis but they subdued thereafter somewhat. In recent years, there is a 
resurgence of bank output losses in most Member States. This roller coaster type of movement 
in bank output losses is very alarming. Some heterogeneity across Member States is observed, 
notably for France for which losses in other earning assets fall below 5% in recent years, though 
bank output losses is a serious concern for all. 
These findings reveal an unpleasant reality as the Eurozone banking industry is facing 
large output losses as a result of uncertainty in bank output prices in recent years. It is true that 
output losses were high during the crisis across all Eurozone Member States (including the 
large Member States such as France and Germany that were supposed to weather the crisis 
well), yet their persistence thereafter is troublesome. 
What we observe is evidence of bank ‘risk averse management’, that is bank managers 
in the face of uncertainty in bank output prices opt for lower bank output, whether as bank loans 
or other earning assets. This attitude towards lower bank output has been emerging since the 
financial crisis, and we do not detect a reversion, suggesting that the financial cycle has been 
prolonged in the Eurozone. Some significant bank output loss is reported prior to the crisis as 
the average bank loss in loans (other earning assets) is 12% (10%) in the period 2001 to 2007. 
And despite the fact that bank output loss increased up to 22% during the crisis, it is worrying 
that since the crisis bank out loss remains at higher levels than before the crisis (see Table 4). 






whether intervention is warranted to mitigate the effects of persistence in bank risk aversion. It 
could be the case that ECB’s monetary policy could come to aid. 
Clearly though, since 2007 there is an escalation of bank risk aversion in the Eurozone, 
casting doubts over the soundness of the industry.30 Acharya & Mora (2015) demonstrate that 
insolvent banks resort to raising rates as a way to attract deposits, and thereby enhance their 
capitalization, in the event losses occur in banks outputs. As the solvency risk of a bank 
increases, its realized rates of return decrease and despite the fact that weak institutions may 
offer substantially higher rates in the run up to failure, the realized rates of return will not be 
recovered. From this point of view, we provide evidence herein that uncertainty in output prices 
or uncertainty in rates of return on bank outputs, such as bank loans, other earning assets and 
off balance sheet items and fees, would be considered as the main drivers of bank risk aversion 
and bank risk therefore in the Eurozone. We also reveal, rather alarmingly, that persistence of 
bank output losses is widely spread across all of the Eurozone in recent years, and not confined 
just in the periphery. 
As we provide a measure of bank output loss using non-parametric estimations we 
present in Table 5 this non-parametric measure of bank output loss while in parentheses we 
report standard deviations. Results show, once more, that during the crisis we have significant 
bank losses in output, whether on loans or other earning assets or off balance sheet items and 
fees. For example, note that due to the uncertainty bank loans (bank other earning assets) are 
21% (27%) in the Eurozone periphery during the crisis, whilst losses remain high thereafter 
though there is some correction to 19% (18%) in 2012 to 2015. Bank output losses remain at 
high levels over the whole sample. For France and Germany there is a significant, from a 
statistical and economic point of view, higher loss in bank loans and other earning assets during 
the crisis, though in recent years it appears that some recovery in loss of output is in place. Yet, 
even for large Eurozone Member States bank risk aversion plays an important role, in line with 
parametric estimations. 
 
30 Acharya & Mora (2015) report that ‘toxic’ financial assets, such as subprime loans, were a major part 
of commercial and investment bank balance sheets in US, and EU in general, undermining bank 
solvency. When risks escalated banks had little room to maneuver other than as a first reaction seek to 
raise their deposits by offering higher rates. In fact, non-solvent banks were the ones that offered higher 
interest rates. This effect has been magnified somewhat by quantitative and qualitative easing of 
monetary policy at the global level. Our results pick up such effects in terms of higher risk aversion 







Characteristically, for Greece, although in the early sub-period the loans (other earning 
assets) under certainty would have been 10% (12%), that is much lower loss compared to the 
loss of the Eurozone periphery, but also if compared to output loss in France and Germany, 
thereafter Greek bank loans (other earning assets) losses rocketed to 25% (31%) during the 
crisis. Since the crisis, Greek bank output losses show very strong persistence. This, clearly, 
illustrates that risk due to uncertainties in output prices in Greece has increased dramatically, 
during and after the crisis, as consolidation in banking (and fiscal) balance sheets is still 
pending. Uncertainties in output prices have severely distorted bank behavior as revealed by 
hikes in bank risk aversion that leads to bank output losses. 
5.3. The long run impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
Against a disturbing backdrop of Eurozone bank output losses during the crisis and 
thereafter, it is of interest to assess whether ECB’s intervention has been effective to moderate 
these losses. So here we provide evidence of second stage analysis based on GMM estimation 
of a panel VAR (see Appendix III for the GMM estimator of a panel VAR). This analysis takes 
into account of the impact of the combined conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
on bank risk aversion. By doing so, we can reveal bank output losses due to uncertainty in 
output prices in the presence of ECB’s interventions. 
In Table 6 we report the bank output losses due to uncertainty in output prices taking 
into account the impact of ECB’s monetary policies.31 A comparison with results in Table 5 
reveals that indeed ECB’s monetary policy, overall, mitigates the bank output loss due to 
uncertainty in output prices. Over the whole period the average bank loss of output is close to 
2% less than it would have been without the intervention of the ECB. These results show that 
ECB’s interventions have been effective on average to curb bank output loss. Note, though, that 
there is some variability across Member States of the Eurozone, as the periphery benefits most 
from the ECB’s monetary policy actions. Over the whole period the average bank output loss 
in the periphery (Greece) is reported to be 3% (4%) less because of the intervention of the ECB. 
This is particularly evident for bank loans, that are higher by 8% due to ECB intervention in 
the periphery (9% in Greece) during the period 2012 to 2015. For France there are also some 
 
31 We report the non-parametric estimations. Parametric estimations are similar and available upon 
request. 
Loss in Output, in % Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS
13.12% 7.45% 9.44 19.45% 16.65% 13.20 12.45% 6.32% 9.44
(3.44) (2.61) (2.71) (3.45) (2.76) (4.15) (3.25) (3.45) (1.55)
12.43% 5.52% 7.32 22.34% 12.35% 11.15 10.24% 5.21% 8.12
(3.71) (3.07) (2.55) (2.40) (5.22) (5.45) (3.28) (2.87) (2.30)
9.76% 12.36% 9.43 25.12% 31.14% 13.20 24.33% 30.25% 9.44
(2.22) (4.17) (1.87) (5.44) (3.16) (4.67) (5.57) (4.65) (3.13)
18.16% 21.32% 14.12 21.36% 27.34% 19.15 19.25% 18.25% 11.20
(2.72) (5.44) (4.11) (4.06) (6.22) (7.12) (3.15) (4.32) (4.41)
Table 5. Bank loss of output due to risk without ECB policy actions: Non-parametric estimates
Notes. The table reports the loss of output calculated with equation (25) which represents the difference of output between the no-uncertainty
(full information) case and the uncertainty case, and which can be interpreted as the change in bank risk aversion.Output loss is calculated











gains as the loss of bank output is by 0.6% less due to ECB’s monetary policy. This is, though, 
rather low if compared to the periphery. Interestingly, for the case of Germany our results reveal 
that the bank output loss is slightly higher by 0.2% because of the ECB intervention. This higher 
bank output loss in the case of Germany is mostly on other earning assets and it is particularly 
noticeable during the third period of our sample, that is 2012-2015. 
 
 Our findings reveal that the ECB’s interventions appear to have an asymmetric effect 
across Member States with Germany facing challenges because of such interventions. This 
asymmetry highlights the complexities involved in a currency zone with considerable 
heterogeneity in the way that uncertainty and thereby bank risk aversion affects the banking 
industry. Yet, we demonstrate that there have been some changes in bank behavior over time, 
as picked by our bank risk aversion measure due to ECB policy. Such changes in bank behavior 
are also varying across Eurozone with large Member States exhibiting a higher bank risk 
aversion in response to ECB monetary policy. 
In addition to the above evidence, Table 7 reports the long run effect of monetary policy 
on bank risk aversion. Note that we report results for all the underlying components of monetary 
policy. 
 
The impact of conventional monetary policy, that is the rate on the deposit facility 
(DEP) and the rate on the marginal lending facility (MLFr), on bank risk aversion is negative 
across Member States and the Eurozone as a whole. Interestingly, the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy varies. On the one hand, the impact of the securities markets program together 
with the covered bond purchase program (SEC) and the marginal lending facility (MLF) is 
clearly negative, suggesting that unconventional monetary policy subdues bank risk aversion. 
Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS Loans OEA OBS
14.44 9.81 11.13 19.32 12.30 8.33 12.21 8.44 6.13
(4.12] (4.34] (3,81] (5.12] (5.81] (3.15] (4.22] (2.14] (1.45]
13,15 8.23 9.47 15.21 12.40 7.81 10.15 8.12 9.51
(3.81] (2.50] (3.12] (5.12] (5.12] (3.20] (2,51] (2.10] (2.51]
8.22 18.20 11.51 12.33 25.12 20.17 17.44 14.21 15.45
(2.28] (3.81] (3.44] (3,44] (6.22] (8.81] (5.10] (6.15] (4.55]
11.30 17.21 15.22 16.21 21.30 9.13 9.33 8.44 7.33
(2.81] (4.32] (4.20] (4,48] (6.45] (2.53] (1.88] (2.07] (2.64]
Notes. The table reports the loss of output calculated with equation (25) which represents the difference of output between the no-uncertainty (full information) case and
the uncertainty case, and which can be interpreted as the change in bank risk aversion.This output loss is calculated with ECB policy actions. OEA are Other Earning
Assets and OBS are Off Balance Sheet items and fees.
2012-20152008-20112001-2007




Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Eurozone
Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland
France Germany
-0.155 -0.33 -0.23 -0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.143 -0.232 -0.43 -0.055
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
-0.028 -0.125 -0.032 -0.035
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
0.032 0.071 0.022 0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
0.012 -0.085 0.022 0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
-0.013 -0.028 -0.024 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Table 7. Effect of monetary policy on bank risk aversion: the long run effect
Marginal lending facility
Notes. GMM estimation of the panel VAR in equation A.12 in Appendix. The components of monetary policy comprise: the rate on the deposit facility at which banks may
use to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem (DEP); the rate on the marginal lending facility which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem (MLFr);
Securities Markets Programme (SMP) together with the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1), and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 2 (CBPP2) (SEC);







Rate on deposit facility









On the other hand, the impact of the longer-term refinancing operations (LTREFIN) on bank 
risk aversion is positive for France and Germany and the Eurozone overall. So once more, we 
reveal the complexities involved in monetary policy as some interventions appear to enhance 
uncertainty. Therefore, caution in what monetary policy can achieve across the Eurozone is 
warranted. 
5.4. The generalized measure of bank risk 
In addition, we report a generalized measure bank risk (GMR thereafter) as 
GMR = log S* .32 This measure of bank risk is generalized as we define risk in the context of 
a system. To be more precise, suppose we have random variables  1,..., ~ ( , ).N N   
= 
 
To define an overall measure of risk, it is customary to use the log determinant of Σ. The reason 
is that the density of ξ evaluated at the mean, is proportional to the negative log determinant of 
Σ. The generalized risk measure comes from local likelihood estimation which is bank-year 
specific.33
  
The generalized risk measure comes from local likelihood estimation which is bank-
year specific. Table 8 reports the long run impact of conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy on the generalized measure of bank risk, which is reported to carry a negative sign in 
most of the cases. Results seem to provide further evidence of earlier results in Table 7. Overall, 
ECB’s interventions assist to subdue the general level of bank risk and as such it provides 
reassurance for banks in the Eurozone to expand bank output. However, when it comes to 
monetary policy no one size fits all, notably for Germany. 
  
Figure 4 draws the GMR over time, reporting the underlying shape of the financial 
cycle of the Eurozone. In recent years, uncertainty is subdued, providing evidence that ECB’s 
monetary policy is on the right track regarding safeguarding financial stability on average. 
Figure 4: Generalized measure of risk 
 
32 GMR is derived from the share equations (14) and (15) as we take the sub-matrix, which corresponds 
to the covariance matrix of loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees. 
33 Please note that in Appendix (II) we provide details of the local log likelihood function (see equation 
(A.9) for the non-parametric estimation method. 
Eurozone
Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland
France Germany
-0.081 -0.073 -0.085 -0.077
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
-0.052 -0.044 -0.044 -0.04
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.033 -0.017 -0.021 -0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
0.014 0.022 0.019 0.022
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.019 -0.036 -0.025 -0.013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
0.021 0.021 0.032 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Marginal lending facility
Notes. GMM estimation of the panel VAR in equation A.12 in Appendix.The components of monetary policy comprise: the rate on the deposit facility at which banks may use to
make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem (DEP); the rate on the marginal lending facility which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem (MLFr); Securities Markets
Programme (SMP) together with the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1), and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 2 (CBPP2) (SEC); Main refinancing operations
(REFIN); Longer-term refinancing operations (LTREFIN); and, the marginal lending facility (MLF).
Table 8. Effect of monetary policy on GMR: Eurozone (2001-2015), total long run effect.
Rate on deposit facility
















Note: Authors’ local likelihood estimations of generalized measure of risk, GMR = log S* .  
However, leaving aside the effect of monetary policy on the periphery, our bank risk 
analysis reveals that the Eurozone banking industry, despite recent strong monetary policy 
interventions whether conventional or nonconventional, is far from being on solid ground. 
Clearly, monetary policy has been supportive, yet Eurozone bank output losses due to rising 
bank risk aversion and rising uncertainty regarding output prices remain rather pertinent. In a 
sense, the present results highlight that further action is warranted to reduce bank output prices 
uncertainty and thereby reduce bank output losses. Along these lines, our methodology could 
offer a novel early warning mechanism of monitoring bank risk and thus bank output loss based 
on micro foundations. 
5.5. The short run impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policy: Generalised 
Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) 
Following from the long run effect of monetary policy on bank risk aversion, we report 
next the underlying short run dynamics by applying a panel VAR as presented in Appendix III. 
This panel VAR model lessens a priori assumptions about the underlying relationships between 
bank risk aversion and monetary policy. All variables enter panel VAR as endogenous within 
a system of equations. Figure 5 draws the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) 
over ten periods ahead, reporting the response of the bank risk aversion to a one standard 
deviation shock in the conventional or unconventional monetary policy.34 
Figure 5: Generalised impulse response functions of bank risk aversion to monetary 
policy 
 
34 The panel VAR is of order one as indicated by the Schwarz (1978) information criterion. Unobserved 
cross country heterogeneity is taken into account by specifying country specific fixed terms. To facilitate 
the presentation we do not report GIRFs for the response of bank risk aversion to its own shocks. Standard 
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Notes. The components of monetary policy comprise: the rate on the deposit facility at which banks may 
use to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem (DEP); the rate on the marginal lending facility 
which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem (MLFr); Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) together with the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1), and the Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme 2 (CBPP2) (SEC); Main refinancing operations (REFIN); Longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTREFIN); and, the marginal lending facility (MLF). ESPTIRLITA notes Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Italy. 
The GIRFs show that the response of the bank risk aversion, and thus of the bank output 
losses, to a shock in conventional monetary policy, whether it is the rate on the deposit facility 
(DEP) or the rate on the marginal lending facility (MLFr), is negative across Member States 
and the Eurozone as a whole. So conventional monetary policy assists to mitigate uncertainty 
in the banking industry in the short run. The same is true for the response to the unconventional 
monetary policy as defined by the securities markets program together with the covered bond 
purchase programs (SEC) and by the marginal lending facility (MLF). However, the response 
to the main refinancing operations (REFIN) and the longer-term refinancing operations 
(LTREFIN) on the bank risk aversion is positive across the Eurozone. This asymmetry in the 
response of the banking industry to the monetary policy is present in the short run as identified 
earlier in the long run. 
We also report the GIRFs for the generalized risk measure, GMR = log S* . Figure 6 
reports the GIRFs. Once more, overall ECB’s interventions assist to subdue the general level 
of bank risk, though certain unconventional monetary policy actions (see the main refinancing 
operations REFIN and the longer-term refinancing operations LTREFIN) have positively 
affected the bank risk in the short run. 








Notes. The components of monetary policy comprise: the rate on the deposit facility at which banks may 
use to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem (DEP); the rate on the marginal lending facility 
which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem (MLFr); Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) together with the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1), and the Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme 2 (CBPP2) (SEC); Main refinancing operations (REFIN); Longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTREFIN); and, the marginal lending facility (MLF). ESPTIRLITA notes Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Italy. 
Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina (2014) for Spain and Ioannidou, Ongena, & 
Peydró (2015) for Bolivia for example show that expansionary conventional monetary policy 
may amplify bank risk taking that may result in both an increase in bank loans and in higher 
default rates. Our results show that aggressive unconventional monetary policy may have a 
corresponding impact on bank risk, implying “moral hazard”. Indeed we find that the 
unconventional monetary easing lowers bank risk and as such it could increase the volume of 
bank loans, other earning assets and off balance sheet items and fees in the periphery of the 
Eurozone, but also that some measures of unconventional monetary policy may have the 
opposite effect. In effect, our findings complement the literature on the risk-taking channel by 
documenting a heterogeneous response depending on policy measure and country in the 
Eurozone. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper formulates an indirect utility function to estimate the first four moments of 
the output prices’ distribution parametrically and non-parametrically. Our new estimation 
techniques are then applied to Eurozone banking, where the degree of financial integration 
among Members States has been, supposedly, quite advanced. 
The results indicate that input and output elasticities differ widely before and after the 
subprime crisis making it possible to use the model routinely to provide early warning signals 
about possible crises. Rising uncertainties in bank output prices lead to an increasing bank risk 






thereafter across most Member States of the Eurozone. Policy interventions ought to look at 
financial stability, but not only focus on capital requirements. It may be necessary to reduce 
uncertainty regarding bank output return/prices, and this might involve some restructuring of 
the Eurozone banking industry. 
On a positive note, we show that the ECB’s monetary policy in recent years subdues 
bank output losses on average. However, there is some variability of the impact of ECB’s 
interventions, mainly on the refinancing operations, on bank uncertainty across Member States 
of the Eurozone. For Germany, in particular, ECB’s interventions might have enhance the bank 
risk aversion and as result the output losses might also have increased in recent years. 
Accelerating the process towards a Eurozone banking union could ease the heterogeneity across 
Member States and a unifying banking market could foster the necessary restructuring of the 
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